Inspiration from 'Processed' Canon
Oct. 3rd, 2025 09:28 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png)
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Do we have to forgive?
There’s a story in the Talmud (Ta’anit 2a-b) that says that Rabbi Elazar ben Shimon once insulted a man – called him ugly. And then immediately realized that he had done wrong. He got down off his donkey and pleaded for forgiveness. He said, “נַעֲנֵיתִי לְךָ, מְחוֹל לִי! – I have wronged you, please forgive me!”
But the insulted man wasn’t ready to forgive.
So Rabbi Elazar followed him back to town, where the townspeople encouraged the man – begged him – to forgive the rabbi, “שֶׁאָדָם גָּדוֹל בְּתוֹרָה הוּא – because he is a great teacher of Torah.”
And the insulted man–I assume reluctantly–agreed to forgive, as long as Rabbi Elazar wouldn’t behave that way again.
Do we have to forgive? The story seems to hint that the answer is yes. The man essentially gets pressured into forgiving the rabbi – not because he wants to. Not because he’s ready to. But because the society around him wants to make this thing go away. Society is not prepared to genuinely hold him in his pain.
And we could write this off as a one-time thing – I mean, it’s just a story in the Talmud – except that it’s not a one-time thing. It is, in many ways, a Jewish doctrine.
Built into Jewish teachings about the High Holy Days is the idea that we are supposed to forgive.
Many of you are familiar with the famous teaching that if you wrong a person, you can’t just go to God for forgiveness – you have to make it right with them. As it says in the Mishneh Torah (Laws of Repentance 2:9):
עֲבֵרוֹת שֶׁבֵּין אָדָם לַחֲבֵרוֹ… אֵינוֹ נִמְחַל לוֹ לְעוֹלָם עַד שֶׁיִּתֵּן לַחֲבֵרוֹ מַה שֶּׁהוּא חַיָּב לוֹ וִירַצֵּהוּ.
Transgressions between a person and another person… are never forgiven until you go to the person with reparations and to ask forgiveness.
And if they say no you have to try again, and if they say no again you have to try again a third time. But after the third time you are considered to have fulfilled your responsibility. You’ve done what you can – you’ve apologized – and at that point it says ְזֶה שֶׁלֹּא מָחַל הוּא הַחוֹטֵא -the one who refused to forgive is now considered the sinner.
This is a really nice teaching from a repentance perspective – because it teaches us that we have to make right with other people. We have to do the work of reconciliation here on earth.
But it’s a really challenging paradigm from the point of view of the person who was wronged. Because it pretty much says that you have to forgive, and if you don’t, you’ve done wrong. Now you’re the sinner.
I don’t think that this can be all that Judaism has to say about forgiveness. And today, I want to explore a different paradigm. It’s one that comes out of the book that we’re going to read this afternoon: the book of Jonah.
Jonah is, in my opinion, the strangest book in the Tanach. It tells the story of the prophet Jonah, who is called to go to the people of Nineveh and tell them to change their ways. And who promptly runs in the opposite direction. He doesn’t want the job. Many of you know what happens next – he can’t escape God’s decree. He gets caught up in a storm, and then he spends three days in the belly of a giant fish which spits him out at Nineveh. And he finally tells the people to repent. And lo and behold, they do.
Jonah is, in some ways, a satire of prophecy. You have the prophet who has to be delivered by giant fish. The people who immediately repent their ways. The divine judgement that is completely and totally forestalled. Jonah makes repentance look easy.
By the way, that’s probably why we read it today – to remind us that teshuvah is both doable and transformative. That repentance is not some faraway, out-of-reach task. It’s the human task of examining our deeds and trying to be our best selves. AND, as the book suggests, our teshuvah has the capacity to be transformative – to temper the divine decree; to repair what is broken inside us and around us – just as it does for the people of Nineveh.
But that doesn’t help us with our forgiveness problem. So I think we have to look closely for another message that comes only in the final verses of the book.
In the last chapter of Jonah, the prophet gets aggravated that the people were forgiven, that their divine punishment was cancelled. He says to God, “I knew you were going to do that!”
יָדַ֗עְתִּי כִּ֤י אַתָּה֙ אֵֽל־חַנּ֣וּן וְרַח֔וּם אֶ֤רֶךְ אַפַּ֙יִם֙ וְרַב־חֶ֔סֶד וְנִחָ֖ם עַל־הָרָעָֽה׃
“I knew You were a compassionate and gracious God, slow to anger, abounding in kindness, renouncing punishment.”
That’s why I ran away in the first place! So I wouldn’t look like a liar for predicting their demise right before you cancelled it.
It sounds heartless, right? Why wouldn’t Jonah want these people to be live and be well? Why doesn’t Jonah want what’s best for his fellow human beings? Why can’t he forgive?
But if we think about it, can’t we understand just a little bit? He’s feeling hurt by the situation – he’s feeling embarrassed, ashamed, undermined. It’s very hard in a situation like that to see beyond your own hurt. It’s very hard in a situation like that for us to see the humanity of the other.
And so God does something to remind Jonah of that.
Here’s what happens: Jonah goes and sits to watch what will happen to the city, and God makes a gourd plant grow over his head to provide shade. Then God makes the plant die, and Jonah gets upset about that.
And God says:
אַתָּ֥ה חַ֙סְתָּ֙ עַל־הַקִּ֣יקָי֔וֹן – You cared about the plant, which you didn’t even grow…
וַֽאֲנִי֙ לֹ֣א אָח֔וּס עַל־נִינְוֵ֖ה הָעִ֣יר הַגְּדוֹלָ֑ה – Shouldn’t I care about Nineveh, that city of more than 120,000 people who don’t even know their right hand from their left?”
At first blush, this looks like a sharp rebuke of Jonah – How dare you be so heartless! How dare you care more about a plant than about people? How dare you not forgive!
But let’s notice what God does and doesn’t say. God doesn’t say “Jonah, you have to care about the people of Nineveh.” Instead God says, “Jonah, I care about the people of Nineveh.” I care about them, God says, because they are people – people who (as the text says) don’t know their right from their left. People walk through the world hurting other people, making mistakes, doing their best, but often falling short.
God is modelling for us one of the core elements of forgiveness – which is the effort to see humanity in the other, even in the people who hurt us.
Think about the power of that act. When we try to see others as human – it opens up the possibility for us of viewing them and their actions differently. Of putting their behaviour (and our own) into a human context. Maybe they hurt us because they were hurt . Maybe they were scared, or angry, or experiencing scarcity. It helps us be curious. It helps us try to understand why others act as they do.
That’s not the same thing as excusing them, and it may not mean that we want to be their best friends – but it might just shift us away from hurt and toward compassion. And that is the first step toward forgiveness.
Do we have to forgive? I just don’t think you can legislate that kind of thing. Telling us we have to do something is the worst motivation ever.
But what Judaism does tell us is that it is Godly to try to see the humanity in others – even others who have hurt us. And that in the end, that is one way that we can move ourselves and our world toward healing.
Lois Beckett, "Perky Maxwell House viral ad takes on housing crisis as ‘Maxwell Apartment’", The Guardian 10/1/2025:
Housing in the US has become so unaffordable that a coffee company has based a viral marketing campaign on the idea that almost nobody can afford to buy a house.
Maxwell House coffee, a 133-year-old brand, recently launched a marketing campaign rebranding themselves as “Maxwell Apartment coffee”.
“Maxwell House? In this economy?” a narrator asks in a video ad, promising that Maxwell Apartment is “the same affordable coffee you love, now with an even more affordable name”.
The ad's audio:
You can see the video here. And a link to the press release, which offers a 12-month coffee lease:
Beginning on National Coffee Day (Sept. 29), Maxwell House’s 12-month “lease” offer of Maxwell Apartment coffee is available on Amazon.com, while supplies last. For under \$40, fans can stock their pantry with a full year of coffee – designed to save coffee enthusiasts more than \$1,000 annually, compared to daily café runs,2 which on average can add up to more than \$90 per month. Along with the rebranded canisters, the year-long supply of coffee will come with an official Maxwell Apartment “lease” to sign.
…that quickly sold out.
The name "Maxwell House" originated with a fancy hotel in Nashville, suggesting other down-market lodging choices as possible next steps. Among the many (mostly critical) comments, this was my favorite:
Maxwell Apartment? How about Maxwell Mom's Basement?
— Scrappy Sue (@scrappy_momma) October 1, 2025
A pathbreaking, new book from Brill:
The Vernacular World of Pu Songling
Popular Literature and Manuscript Culture in Late Imperial China
Series: Sinica Leidensia, Volume: 173 (2025). xix, 312 pp.
By Zhenzhen Lu
From the press:
This study presents a lively world of vernacular writing from Zichuan, Shandong, the home region of Pu Songling (1640–1715). Based on Keio University’s Liaozhai Collection, it examines a world of local reading and writing through the manuscripts of village scholars, including those of a topolectal primer and various song-narratives attributed to the author famed for his classical tales Liaozhai zhiyi.
The study sheds light on intertwined realms of local textual transmission, the place of manuscript culture in ordinary literary life, and the role of language and locality in shaping the plural literatures of late imperial China.
This extraordinary volume is distinguished by its numerous photographs of manuscripts, many in color and never published before, together with transcriptions and translations.
We must remember that Pu Songling 蒲松齡, the author of these vernacular tales — heretofore barely known even to scholars — was also the author of the immensely popular Strange Tales from Make-do Studio, tr. Denis C. & Victor H. Mair (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1989), which were written in exquisite Classical Chinese / Literary Sinitic. The colloquial, topolectal nature of the stories featured in this new tome by Zhenzhen Lu could hardly be more different from the elegant Strange Tales from Make-do Studio, for which he is one of the most famous authors in Chinese literary history.
A final note on the standing of these vernacular folk tales in the traditional hierarchy of literary genres — poetry, prose, drama, and fiction: bottom of the totem pole. Now, with Zhenzhen Lu's magnificent monograph, the misconception that the bottom of the literary totem pole is the lowest in value is corrected. Instead, she shows how these vernacular tales are foundational, closest to the ground and the reader.
Selected readings
An interesting recent paper (Adithya Bhaskar, Xi Ye, & Danqi Chen, “Language Models that think, chat better”, arXiv.org 09/24/2025) starts like this:
THINKING through the consequences of one’s actions—and revising them when needed—is a defining feature of human intelligence (often called “system 2 thinking”, Kahneman (2011)). It has also become a central aspiration for large language models (LLMs).1
The footnote:
1Language models think, therefore, language models are?
There are no other references to René Descartes in the paper, or to ontological uncertainty. So let's follow up a bit.
The famous "Je pense, donc je suis" quote comes from the fourth chapter of Discours de la Méthode (1637), "Preuves de l'existence de Dieu et de l'âme humaine ou fondements de la métaphysique" ("Proofs of the existence of God and of the human soul or foundations of metaphysics"). It starts this way:
Je ne sais si je dois vous entretenir des premières méditations que j'y ai faites; car elles sont si métaphysiques et si peu communes, qu'elles ne seront peut-être pas au goût de tout le monde: et toutefois, afin qu'on puisse juger si les fondements que j'ai pris sont assez fermes, je me trouve en quelque façon contraint d'en parler.
I don't know whether I should discuss with you my first meditations on this topic; for they are so metaphysical and so unusual that they will perhaps not be to everyone's taste: and yet, in order that one may judge whether the foundations I have taken are sufficiently firm, I find myself somehow constrained to speak of them.
To make sense of this, we need to revisit the full title of the work, and the context of this chapter — "Discourse on the method for conducting one's reason properly, and seeking truth in the sciences. Plus Optics, Meteorology, and Geometry. Which are the tests of this method."
In other words, this is science and mathematics, not theology; or more exactly, this chapter explores the theological and metaphysical foundations for science and mathematics, which the author is a bit ashamed of discussing.
The whole first paragraph of section four (in the modern spelling found in the cited edition):
Je ne sais si je dois vous entretenir des premières méditations que j'y ai faites; car elles sont si métaphysiques et si peu communes, qu'elles ne seront peut-être pas au goût de tout le monde: et toutefois, afin qu'on puisse juger si les fondements que j'ai pris sont assez fermes, je me trouve en quelque façon contraint d'en parler. J'avais dès longtemps remarqué que pour les moeurs il est besoin quelquefois de suivre des opinions qu'on sait être fort incertaines, tout de même que si elles étaient indubitables, ainsi qu'il a été dit ci-dessus: mais pour ce qu'alors je désirais vaquer seulement à la recherche de la vérité, je pensai qu'il fallait que je fisse tout le contraire, et que je rejetasse comme absolument faux tout ce en quoi je pourrais imaginer le moindre doute, afin de voir s'il ne
resterait point après cela quelque chose en ma créance qui fût entièrement indubitable. Ainsi, à cause que nos sens nous trompent quelquefois, je voulus supposer qu'il n'y avait aucune chose qui fût telle qu'ils nous la font imaginer; et parce qu'il y a des hommes qui se méprennent en raisonnant, même touchant les plus simples matières de géométrie, et y font des paralogismes, jugeant que j'étais sujet à faillir autant qu'aucun autre, je rejetai comme fausses toutes les raisons que j'avais prises auparavant pour démonstrations; et enfin, considérant que toutes les mêmes pensées que nous avons étant éveillés nous peuvent aussi venir quand nous dormons, sans qu'il y en ait aucune pour lors qui soit vraie, je me résolus de feindre que toutes les choses qui m'étaient jamais entrées en l'esprit n'étaient non plus vraies que les illusions de mes songes. Mais aussitôt après je pris garde que, pendant que je voulais ainsi penser que tout était faux, il fallait nécessairement que moi qui le pensais fusse quelque chose; et remarquant que cette vérité: Je pense, donc je suis, était si ferme et si assurée, que toutes les plus extravagantes suppositions des sceptiques n'étaient pas capables de l'ébranler, je jugeai que je pouvais la recevoir sans scrupule pour le premier principe de la philosophie que je cherchais.
I am in doubt as to the propriety of making my first meditations in the place above mentioned matter of discourse; for these are so metaphysical, and so uncommon, as not, perhaps, to be acceptable to every one. And yet, that it may be determined whether the foundations that I have laid are sufficiently secure, I find myself in a measure constrained to advert to them. I had long before remarked that, in relation to practice, it is sometimes necessary to adopt, as if above doubt, opinions which we discern to be highly uncertain, as has been already said; but as I then desired to give my attention solely to the search after truth, I thought that a procedure exactly the opposite was called for, and that I ought to reject as absolutely false all opinions in regard to which I could suppose the least ground for doubt, in order to ascertain whether after that there remained aught in my belief that was wholly indubitable. Accordingly, seeing that our senses sometimes deceive us, I was willing to suppose that there existed nothing really such as they presented to us; and because some men err in reasoning, and fall into paralogisms, even on the simplest matters of geometry, I, convinced that I was as open to error as any other, rejected as false all the reasonings I had hitherto taken for demonstrations; and finally, when I considered that the very same thoughts (presentations) which we experience when awake may also be experienced when we are asleep, while there is at that time not one of them true, I supposed that all the objects (presentations) that had ever entered into my mind when awake, had in them no more truth than the illusions of my dreams. But immediately upon this I observed that, whilst I thus wished to think that all was false, it was absolutely necessary that I, who thus thought, should be somewhat; and as I observed that this truth, I think, therefore I am (COGITO ERGO SUM), was so certain and of such evidence that no ground of doubt, however extravagant, could be alleged by the sceptics capable of shaking it, I concluded that I might, without scruple, accept it as the first principle of the philosophy of which I was in search.
(The Latin version "Cogito ergo sum" comes from his 1644 Principia Philosophiae.)
So Bhaskar et al.'s footnote (jokingly?) hints that current AI chain-of-thought reasoning might eventually lead to a foundational premise on the basis of which non-hallucinatory conclusions can reliably be derived.
That's the first time I've seen this idea suggested. I'm skeptical that things will work out that way, unless maybe the systems are primed to parrot La Méthode. But we'll see…
Here's the plan: every Friday, let's recommend some people and/or communities to follow on Dreamwidth. That's it. No complicated rules, no "pass this on to 7.328 friends or your cat will die".